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MR. JUSTICE SUTHERLAND. By Joel Paschal. Princeton University Press,
1951. Pp. xii, 267. $4.00.
THIRTY-TWO years ago an America thoroughly tired of brilliance, reform,
world-saving and liberalism elected Warren G. Harding as President. For the
dominant mood of the time, the choice was good; that amiable, handsome
non-entity could be relied upon not to disturb anyone deliberately.
As befitted a candidate chosen because he was the very antithesis of a
crusader, as well as because he couldn't do himself nearly as much harm by
silence as by talking, Harding ran a "front porch campaign" and stayed off
the stump. Principal among his veranda advisers, after the members of the
"Ohio gang," was his old Senate companion, George Sutherland of Utah.
Sutherland, one of the first to realize that dark-horse Harding would survive
when the other candidates knocked each other out, gave firm post-nomination
advice to the candidate: "We have only to sit tight to be sure of winning."
After the election, Sutherland himself sat tight. Not in the Cabinet, he was
untouched by scandal. Fifteen months after Harding took office, he appointed
Sutherland to the Supreme Court.
Once again, for the dominant mood of the time, the choice was admirable.
When the American people chose Harding, they chose conservatism. When
he chose Sutherland, Harding gave more lasting form to that choice. But
Harding did more than pick a man of conservative slant; he chose an able
lawyer and a deeply systematic exponent of conservative philosophy. If Suther-
land be compared with the other conservative extremists of the Bench from
the death of Brewer in 1910 to the passing of McReynolds, the last of the
die-hards, in 1941, he stands at the head of the list by any measure of 4bility.
His accomplishments outrank those of Lamar, Day, McKenna, Van Devanter,
McReynolds, Butler, Sanford, and, more doubtfully, even Taft.
This eminence warrants a first class book about Sutherland, and Mr. Pas-
chal has produced it. A well-written intellectual history, the volume recounts
enough of Sutherland's personal development to keep human interest. An
outstanding quality of the work is its dispassion. Sutherlandism is extinct
now, beyond the acceptance of responsible Americans of any shade of opinion.
Is there anyone left who believes, for example, that government either does
or should lack the power to set minimum wages for women? A modern writer
could treat the credo of the '20's on the one hand as a distant obsolescence,
on the other as a target for barbs from well-remembered controversies.
Paschal does neither. He writes with sympathy, respect, and understanding
of Sutherland's point of view, if with very little acceptance. His tone is sug-
gested by his conclusion:
"Today, less than ten years after his death, there has been a com-
plete, and probably final, repudiation of much of Sutherland's thought.
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Few would contend for his extravagant notions of judicial prerogative.
... Even granting all this, Sutherland's achievement remains a sizable
one. In cases where he did not become enmeshed in his hostility to
government, his opinions continue to have a vital influence... Suther-
land is today influential in both the fair and efficient administration
of justice. And in the field of foreign affairs, he seems destined to en-
joy a lasting preeminence."'
I
Born in England in 1862, Sutherland was brought to Utah the next year
by Mormon parents migrating to the Promised Land.2 His father shortly
abandoned Mormonism, and Sutherland grew up as a Gentile in the Mormon
state. From the root to the flowering of his education in Utah he was indoc-
trinated in laissez faire philosophy, and these views were given legal content
when he studied law at Michigan under Cooley. Sutherland never forgot the
implied maxim of his master: The most important part of a Constitution is
its limitations. Paschal well develops this training, which continued as Suther-
land returned to practice in Utah and through reading and bar activities, fell
under the intellectual leadership of the most conservative forces in the pro-
fession. By 1900, at the age of 38, Sutherland had a full-blown social and legal
philosophy which could only be applied, not expanded, in the remainder of
his life.
In 1900, Sutherland, elected to Congress as a McKinley man, found Theo-
dore Roosevelt in the White House upon his own arrival in Washington. The
new Congressman and the new President did not pull well together, splitting
promptly on an issue of tariff reduction which TR proposed and Sutherland
opposed. In 1905 Sutherland went to the Senate, and soon after, in the Taft
administration, moved into the Republican leadership as a vigorous anti-Pro-
gressive. Though one of the lesser Old Guard leaders, opposing the income
tax and supporting new high tariffs manfully, he was not-and this is im-
portant-a total standpatter. He supported an eight hour day for government
employees, aided in establishing the Children's Bureau, was a leader for
women's suffrage, and dallied with that old devil Socialism itself by support-
ing the Postal Savings system.
In the election of 1912 Sutherland saw his candidate, Taft, fall far behind
Wilson and Roosevelt, but he had the comfort of seeing his own state one of
the two Taft carried. In the Wilson administration, as an opposition Senator,
Sutherland came into his own as an across-the-boards opponent of govern-
ment action. A vitriolic critic of Wilson's domestic and foreign policies, he
particularly opposed the creation of the Federal Trade Commission and the
Clayton Act. His activities made him the darling of the bar associations,
1. P. 240.
2. The facts in this section of the review are drawn from Paschal. The discussion
in the remainder of the review is largely independent of his. and he is not necessarily
chargeable with either the facts or views.
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before whom he regularly spoke. In 1917, as President of the American Bar
Association, his annual address bewailed the sad plight of the business com-
munity, "beset and bedeviled with vexatious statutes, prying commissions,
and government intermeddling of all sorts."
His program, good enough to elect him President of the A.B.A., was not
equally satisfactory to the people of Utah. In 1916, although endorsed by the
American Federation of Labor as a result particularly of his support of sea-
men's legislation, he was defeated for re-election. His Democratic opponent,
William H. King, who turned out to be an equally conservative Senator,
campaigned on the allegation that Sutherland was "the servant of" an "ultra-
respectable class which believes it has a proprietary interest in the government
of this country."
In the six years between the defeat and his judicial appointment, Suther-
land practised law in Washington, aided in the election of Harding, and be-
came an even more articulate conservative than he had been before. He told
the New York Bar Association that "[a]ny attempt to fix a limit to personal
acquisition is filled with danger," and particularly denounced post-World
War I attempts at price control: "It had been proved by centuries of ex-
perience ... under all conceivable circumstances ... that government should
confine its activities, as a general rule, to preserving a free market and pre-
venting fraud." He invoked the principles of laissez faire, as economic "forces
of nature whose movements are entirely outside the scope of human power."
On September 5, 1922, Warren G. Harding took advantage of the retire-
ment of Justice Clarke to put Sutherland into a position to ensure that no
human power would interfere with the economic "forces of nature."
II
The two prime questions about Sutherland the Justice are: first, what did
a devout intellectual conservative believe in the 1920's and 1930's; and second,
how much of a heritage has his work left to our times?
One good source is his own opinions, 281 for the majority and 27 dissents
recorded between 1922 and his retirement in 1938. 4 Quantitatively, certainly,
he did his share of the job, his average of 18 majority opinions giving him
considerably more opinions each year than any Justice of the present Court,
with its light docket of recent years, has had an opportunity to write.
3. Pp. 109, 110.
4. The workmanship of the Paschal book is meticulous throughout except for ai
appendix, doubtless prepared by an assistant, which purports to list all of Sutherland's
opinions. The figures 281 and 27, given above, are based on some revision of that list,
but the corrections are only those which turned up in the course of using the list, and
may not be complete. For examples, Burnet v. Guggenheim, 288 U.S. 280 (1933) ; Bur-
net v. Wells, 289 U.S. 670 (1933); and Cook v. United States, 288 U.S. 102 (1933),
though listed as majority opinions, were dissents. Hart Ref. Co. v. Montana, 278 U.S.
584 (1929) was a per curiam opinion. The Ickes v. Fox, 300 U.S. 82 (1937) group of




As an opinion writer, Sutherland had at least two distinct styles. For what
he regarded as his great cases, he was extensive and comprehensive, though
rarely verbose? For his lesser efforts, he was terse.0 He had a shrewd eye
for the occasions which would warrant one or the other approaches. His
opinions covered not only every aspect of constitutional law, but almost every-
thing else as well. As befits a westerner from an arid state, he was given a
large share of public lands and vater law questions ;7 but he also wrote in a
great number of tax cases," some antitrust cases,9 some employer's liability
cases, 10 and some federal jurisdiction cases." In addition, he was called upon
in a wide range of miscellaneous statutory interpretations.
5. His major cases are mentioned below. He took an interest in the fairly obvious
historical sources, though he did not produce any serious original historical research.
Examples of this historical interest are Patton v. United States, 231 U.S. 276 (1930), on jury
trial in criminal cases; Home Bldg. & Loan Co. v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934), dis-
sent, on the contract clause.
6. Examples are At. C.L.R. Co. v. Ford, 287 U.S. 502 (1933), on presumptions of
liability in railroad accidents; Chi. R_ I. & P.R. Co. v. Schendel, 270 U.S. 611 (1926),
on res judicata. There was, of course, a range of quality in his opinions as vith any
judge. One of the poorest, from the standpoint of simplicity and clarity, is Frost Truck-
ing Co. v. R. R. Comm., 271 U.S. 583 (1926), on the relation of private and public
carriers.
7. E.g., Gulf Ref. Co. v. United States, 269 U.S. 125 (1925) ; Co.% v. Hart, 260 U.S.
427 (1922).
8. Something over 20% of his opinions were tax cases. These include some of his
most rigid and most ephemeral interpretations, as his work on intergovernmental tax
immunities, e.g., Brush v. Comm., 300 U.S. 352 (1937) ; or interpretations of the Internal
Revenue Code, e.g., Crooks v. Harrelson, 282 U.S. 55 (1932), discussed beluw. And
see his Heiner v. Donnan, 285 U.S. 312 (1932), invalidity of presumption that gift is in
contemplation of death; and Helvering v. St. Louis Union Trust Co., 296 U.S. 39 (1935),
on taxability for estate tax purposes of a trust in which deceased had retained a rever-
sionary interest.
9. Notably, if not exactly memorably, Bedford Cut Stone Co. v. Stonecutters Ass'n, 274
U.S. 37 (1927), secondary boycott a violation of the Sherman Act; and, as other ex-
amples, Binderup v. Pathe Exchange, 263 U.S. 291 (1923), applicability of Sherman Act
to leasing of motion pictures films by producers; Industrial Ass'n v. United States, 268
U.S. 64 (1925), restraint in local sale of building materials, not a violation.
10. These are surprisingly numerous. See, e.g., Ches. & 0. v. Mihas, 20 U.S. 102
(1929) ; B. & 0. R. Co. v. Carroll, id. at 491. It cannot be said that Sutherland let
sympathy for individuals affect his judgments in these and other personal injury cases;
see Bait. S.S. Co. v. Phillips, 274 U.S. 316 (1927), suit in admiralty by injured seaman
barred subsequent action at law though admiralty action was dismissed as result of mis-
apprehension of admiralty jurisdiction rather than merits; Erie R.R. Co. v. Duplak, 286
U.S. 440 (1932), five year-old losing leg while playing on railroad track denied re-
covery by virtue of a state statute barring actions of this type.
11. Best known of many are perhaps Kline v. Burke Const. Co., 260 U.S. 226 (1922),
on the power to enjoin state court interference with federal court proceedings, cf. 23
U.S.C. § 2283 (Supp. 1951) and Hum v. Oursler, 2S9 U.S. 238 (1933), attempting to define
"cause of action" for the purpose of "federal question" jurisdiction in copyright cases.
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Sutherland's basic approach was that both the Constitution and the statutes
should be applied exactly as written, with no straining on the part of the Judge
to achieve socially desirable or, indeed, even rational results. Since he equally
firmly believed that the Constitution was written to achieve a wide immuni-
zation of business from control, an inexorable law and his social convictions
usually coincided. And yet, in his rigor juris approach to the law as in the
other aspects of his thought, Sutherland may be too easily pigeonholed. At
times he was capable of a limited freshness and daring.
Consider first some of his restrictive opinions. One of the best known is
the Minnesota Mortgage Moratorium case,12 in which Sutherland dissented
on the ground that the contract clause precluded such mortgage relief. The
opinion is not necessarily narrow in result; a fair-minded man could readily
conclude that the Minnesota legislation pushed the contract clause too far.
But Sutherland's approach is both morally and historically rigid. With a fine
ignorance of what farmers had borne for 15 years, Sutherland assures them
that they can only achieve recovery by more "self-denial and painful effort."
This is legally imperative-because Shays' rebellion had antedated the con-
tract clause and from that whole episode Sutherland deduces that the Found-
ing Fathers opposed a drastic farm relief. In such a view, the Hughes majority
opinion which attempts to discern the progressive spirit of the growth of the
contract clause over 150 years is simply incomprehensible. To Sutherland, in
this mood, the notion of a growing Constitution was a contradiction in terms
-if it grows, it can scarcely be a Constitution.
Clearer examples of his approach are in the immigration and tax fields,
areas in which no judge has ever been more the automaton. In Crooks v.
Harrelson,'3 the issue was the interpretation of the Revenue Act of 1918
which made estates taxable where the interest of the decedent "is subject to
the payment of the charges against his estate and the expenses of its adminis-
tration and is subject to distribution as part of his estate." A Missouri estate,
largely real property, claimed complete immunity from the tax because of an
oddity in Missouri law under which the property was subject to payment of
charges and to distribution, but was not subject to "expenses of its adminis-
tration." Unless by some device or another the "expenses" clause was made
an alternative, the law was made absurd-Congress had by accident taxed
the inheritance of the rest of the real property in the country, but not that in
Missouri. Under the Trinity Church doctrine,14 the Court might have avoided
the absurdity by finding that, despite the words, the law did not accord with
the intent of Congress.
Sutherland rejected this alternative. He would correct absurdities only
where "so gross as to shock the general moral or common sense." He con-
tinued, "It is not enough merely that hard and objectionable or absurd conse-
12. Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934).
13. 282 U.S. 55 (1930).
14. Holy Trinity Church v. United States, 143 U.S. 457 (1892).
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quences. which probably were not within the contemplation of the framers, are
produced by an act of legislation. Laws enacted with good intention, when put
to the test, frequently, and to the surprise of the lawmaker himself, turn out
to be mischievous, absurd, or otherwise objectionable. But in such case the
remedy lies with the lawmaking authority and not with the courts."15
In tax cases, only the fisc suffers from this approach. But in immigration
cases, the results could be tragic. There are scarcely two harsher cases on
the books than two of Sutherland's. In one, an American-born Chinese sought
to bring in his foreign-born wife. Under the statute, if he had been a natural-
ized, instead of a native-born American, he clearly could have done so. The
issue therefore was whether a native-born American should have the same
right to bring in a foreign wife as is accorded a foreign-born American.
Sutherland, conceding that the result "unjustly discriminates against the
native-born citizen," that it was "cruel and inhuman in its results," never-
theless would not stretch the statute to correct its obvious drafting error.10
In a second immigration case, the issue was whether the Palestinian wife and
child of an American rabbi must be deported. One section of the immigration
laws bars immigration from parts of Asia except for specified classes including
ministers and their wives and children. Another permitted free entrance for
ministers without consideration of their geographic origin. Said Sutherland,
this wife and child must be deported because they fell in the hole between
the two sections-because not from the right part of Asia they could not
claim the exemption of the first section, and because they were not the
minister, but only his family, they likewise were excluded from the second.
He concedes that this is a case of "peculiar and distressing hardship"; but
"[t]he contention that it is absurd and unreasonable.., does not require
consideration, since the result we have stated necessarily follows from the
plain words of the law....,,x7
In these cases Sutherland seems almost to welcome the hair shirt of com-
pulsion to patently irrational results. He portrays himself as the instrument
of inevitable law, exemplifying the view he expressed in an address at the
age of 33: "Judges do not make laws, but declare them; the rules which
govern their deliberations and decisions are to a large extent fixed and per-
manent, in no wise to be controlled by temporary considerations or policies."
Hence, he had argued in 1895, Chancellor Kent, then dead a half century,
could if resurrected, "by reading the statutes which have been enacted since
his death ... serve the commonwealth quite as well as any of the present in-
15. Crooks v. Harrelson, supra note 13, at 60. For example of an Internal Revenue
Code case in which the Court takes another approach and quietly overrides an absurdity
in the statute, see Helvering v. Owens, 305 U.S. 463 (1939).
16. Chung Fook v. White, 264 U.S. 443 (1924).
17. Comm. Immig. v. Gottlieb, 265 U.S. 310 (1934). For example of an innigration
case of opposite spirit, in which the Court construes away a statutory rigidity rather than
permit a gross injustice, see Delgadillo v. Carmichael, 332 U.S. 38S (1947).
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cumbents."' 8 These immigration cases particularly read as if they had been
written by a ghost rather than a human being.
And yet his process is not so automatic after all. One opinion which sug-
gests that he was not absolutely controlled by stare decisis overrules two
cases interpreting the Federal Employer's Liability Act.10 During the latter
half of his judicial service, he wrote two opinions in a genuine spirit of
moderate progress. In the Continental Bank case, the issue was whether the
bankruptcy power was broad enough to permit Congress to direct reorgani-
zations as well as bankruptcies. The Founding Fathers certainly had nothing
like railroad reorganizations in mind when they wrote the bankruptcy clause.
Yet Sutherland, who in the mortgage moratorium case found his answer in
the attitude of the Convention toward Shays' rebellion, proclaims his indif-
ference to the 1787 concept when bankruptcy is involved: he recites the
"fundamental and radically progressive nature" of the bankruptcy laws for
a century and a half, which "demonstrate in a very striking way the capacity
of the bankruptcy clause to meet new conditions as they have been disclosed
as a result of the tremendous growth of business and development of human
activities from 1800 to the present day."20
Or consider his other outstanding progressive opinion, Funk v. United
States. The issue was whether in a federal criminal case a wife might testify
in behalf of her husband. Two not-so-ancient Supreme Court cases, following
the common law anachronisms on interested witnesses, had held that such
testimony must be excluded. Sutherland, overruling those cases over the ob-
jection of Justices McReynolds and Butler, applauded the "capacity for
growth and change in the common law," and declined "to perpetuate such
of its rules as, by every reasonable test, are found to be neither wise nor
just," merely "because we have once adopted them."'2 ' He, who would treat
a statute as though it were a device precise enough to measure milligrams,
includes pages in praise of the maxim that common law should never outlast
the reason which gave it birth.
Sutherland's occasional flashes of novelty are at most a piddling progres-
sivism. He tolerated slight changes, but he never shook the temple of the
familiar. To support postal savings in the Senate, to condone reorganization
as within the bankruptcy power, to let a wife testify in support of her hus-
band-these are scarcely exhibits of daring. In one area, and in one only,
was Sutherland actually blazing a trail of power expansion.
That one area was foreign affairs. The Curtiss-Wright case, the Belmont
case, and the Cincinnati Soap case are landmarks today. Curtiss-Wright, the
I& Pp. 17, 18.
19. Chicago & E.I.R. Co. v. Comm., 284 U.S. 296 (1932). This involved Ito casual
overruling; there were conflicting decisions.
20. Continental Ill. Bank v. Chicago, R.I. & P.R. Co., 294 U.S. 648, 671 (1935),
21. Funk v. United States, 290 U.S. 371, 383 (1933).
LVoI, 61
REVIEWS
most important, dearly announces the absolute sovereignty of the federal
government over foreign affairs and, less theoretical and more significant,
gives extraordinarily large range to the powers of the President in that field.22
The Cincinnati Soap case, involving a federal tax on Philippine coconut oil,
includes a firm statement of the powers of Congress over dependencies which,
while not novel, has at least the value of being succinct in an area of the law
where others have been verbose.2 3 Belmont, analyzing the consequences of the
recognition of Russia, is the leading statement of the consequences of recog-
nition and of the powers of the President in respect to it.24
III
Intellectually much of Sutherland may be as remote as the dinosaur. What
is remarkable is that so much remains vital, far more than the dinosauric
comparison comprehends. His colleagues, McReynolds and Van Devanter,
who served far longer, are gone almost without effect in our times; it is pos-
sible that no greater matter will be affected for better or worse, throughout
the 1950's by anything they said. Unlike them, Sutherland is not sunk with-
out trace.
Much of what he wrote has, of course, been overruled. Some of his most
important constitutional interpretations are discarded, and the statutes have
been much revised to escape his rigorous construction. At least 19 of his
opinions, including many of the most important, have been either overruled
or restricted so severely as to be of no consequence, and the number may be
much higher.2 5 His whole approach to due process, as in Adkins v. Children's
22. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Enport Co., 299 U.S. 304, at 319 (1936), says:
"Not only, as we have shown, is the federal power over external affairs in origin and
essential character different from that over internal affairs, but participation in the exer-
cise of the power is significantly limited. In this vast external realm, with its important,
complicated, delicate and manifold problems, the President alone has the power to speak
or listen as a representative of the nation... he alone negotiates. Into the field of negoti-
ation the Senate cannot intrude; and Congress itself is powerless to invade it." The pass-
age may have relevance if Congress should push its inquiries into the recent conversations
between President Truman and Mr. Churchill.
23. Cincinnati Soap Co. v. United States, 301 U.S. 30S (1937).
24. United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324 (1937). Perhaps because of his experience
on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Sutherland resulved legal questions concern-
ing foreign affairs with a different chamber of his mind than he used on purely domestic
questions. The two of his opinions which come closest to being adverse to interests of
property are cases involving the use of the eminent domain power in war time. There
the federal power is broadly upheld, and federal damages kept down. Omnia Commercial
Co. v. United States, 261 U.S. 502 (1923) ; Russell Co. v. United States, id. at 514.
25. The following list gives the Sutherland opinion and unless otherwise noted, the
case which either overrules or sharply limits it: (1) Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 261
U.S. 525 (1923) ; West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 30D U.S. 379 (1937). (2) Bedford
Cut Stone Co. v. Stone Cutters Ass'n, 274 U.S. 37 (1927) ; Hutcheson v. United States, 312
U.S. 219 (1941). (3) Bogardus v. Comm., 302 U.S. 34 (1936) ; discussed with reference to
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Hospital and Ribnik v. McBride; or the commerce clause, as in Carter v.
Carter Coal Co.; or the contract clause, as in Coombes v. Getz, are all of about
the same significance as dinosaur tracks in 1952.20
But consider what remains. The foreign affairs opinions are outstanding
today. Berger v. United States is the leading decision on bias and prejudice
at trial 2 7 and Powell v. Alabama 28 is the great landmark on the right to
counsel in capital cases. Massachusetts v. Mellon,29 by its practical prohibition
of constitutional challenge to federal expenditures, has given more meaning
to the spending power, and has done more to encourage the modern grant-
in-aid system of federal-state relations than any other case-law development
in history. The leading double jeopardy discussion, 0 the original important
encouragement to zoning,"' one of the foremost opinions developing the im-
its limitations in PAUL, FEDERAL ESTATE & GiFT TAXATION § 16.02 (1942). (4) Brush
v. Comm., 300 U.S. 352 (1937) ; Helvering v. Gerhardt, 304 U.S. 405 (1938). (5) Carter
v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Co., 301 U.S. 1
(1937). (6) Colgate v. Harvey, 296 U.S. 404 (1935); Madden v. Kentucky, 309 U.S.
83 (1940). (7) Coombes v. Getz, 285 U.S. 434 (1932); cf. Veix v. Sixth Ward Ass'n,
310 U.S. 32 (1940), which though distinguishable, reflects a very different attitude. (8)
FTC v. Raladam Co., 283 U.S. 643 (1931); cf. Same v. Same, 316 U.S. 149 (1942).
(9) First Nat'l Bank v. Maine, 284 U.S. 312 (1932) ; State Tax Comm. v. Aldrich, 316
U.S. 181 (1942). (10) Frost v. Corp. Comm., 278 U.S. 515 (1929); cf. Tigner v. Texas,
310 U.S. 141 (1940). (11) Frost Trucking Co. v. R. R. Comm., 271 U.S. 583 (1926) ;
cf. Calif. State Ass'n v. Maloney, 341 U.S. 105 (1951). (12) Heiner v. Donnan, 285 U.S.
312 (1932) ; discussed with reference to its statutory and judicial limitations, PAUL, op.
cit. supra § 602. (13) Helvering v. St. Louis Union Trust Co., 296 U.S. 39 (1935) ; Helvering
v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106 (1940). (14) Jones v. SEC, 298 U.S. 1 (1936); cf. as restric-
tive to the point of rejection, Resources Corp. v. SEC, 97 F.2d 788 (7th Cir. 1938) ; Same
v. Same, 103 F.2d 929 (D.C. Cir. 1939). (15) Macallen Co. v. Mass., 279 U.S. 620
(1929) ; cf. Tradesmen's Bank v. Tax Comm., 309 U.S. 560, 566 (1940). (16) New York
ex rel. Rogers v. Graves, 299 U.S. 401 (1937); Graves v. New York, 306 U.S. 466
(1939). (17) Ribnik v. McBride, 277 U.S. 350 (1928) ; Olsen v. Nebraska, 313 U.S. 236
(1941). (18) Tyson Bros. v. Banton, 273 U.S. 418 (1927) ; cf. Olsen v. Nebraska, supra,
and cases there cited. (19) United States v. Macintosh, 283 U.S. 605 (1931) ; Girouard
v. United States, 328 U.S. 61 (1946).
The list is incomplete because not all his opinions were checked. With regard for
obsolescence from all sources, including statutory changes, a very rough guess is that
about half of Sutherland's opinions no longer have any practical significance.
26. The cases are cited in note 25 supra.
27. 295 U.S. 78 (1935).
28. 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
29. 262 U.S. 447 (1923). See also his Alabama Power Co. v. Ickes, 302 U.S. 464
(1937), on the unassailability of grants.
30. Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 (1932).
31. Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926). The zoning cases are a re-
minder that even to Sutherland, far more state laws challenged under due process, the
contract clause, or the commerce clause were valid than were invalid. At the same time
the line between the valid and the invalid was frequently narrow, and Sutherland put no
limit to the degree of judicial supervision over local affairs. Compare the Euclid case
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portant principle that a law may be void for indefiniteness,32 a whole group
of federal jurisdictional decisions,33 and Grosican v. American Press Co.,.2
the outstanding decision on the freedom of the press from discriminatory
taxation-these are a living monument to the dead.
Always courteous, good-natured,33 and diligent, George Sutherland was in
every way an outstanding exponent of conservatism in law. Mr. Paschal's
excellent book gives real insight into a spirit, exemplified in Sutherland, which
not so long ago dominated America, and which, with some adjustment to the
problems of a new decade, may do so again.
JOHN P. FRANKt
EFFECTS OF TAXATION: CORPORATE MERGERS. By J. Keith Butters, John
Lintner and William L. Cary. Boston: Graduate School of Business Adminis-
tration, Harvard University, 1951. Pp. xviii, 364. $4.25.
EcONOMIc EFFECTS OF SECTION 102. Panel Investigation by Tax Institute,
Inc. Princeton, 1951. Pp. x'xiii, 314. $5.00.
IN all branches of human life we act-we must act-with little fore-
knowledge of the consequences. The wise planner does the best he can, never
forgetting that his best-laid plans may go awry. When a tax is levied, its
ultimate effects are as unknowable as the future life of an infant; so far, at
least, neither the theoretician nor the electronic computer has given us greater
power to predict the one than the other. Yet in the tax field, perhaps even
more than in other areas of human affairs, we are surrounded by soothsayers
who confidently promise that one course of action will bring us prosperity
while another will return us to the Stone Age. Almost invariably these
predictions emerge from a single, and simple, minded devotion to the premise
that a tax rests where it first falls, so that a taxed activity is necessarily
repressed. The possibility that the levy will be shifted to some other person
with Nectow v. Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183 (1928), one of the e-tremest due process cases
in the reports. There Sutherland's opinion requires the revision of a zoning line for one
lot in Cambridge, Mass.
32. Connally v. Gen. Coast. Co., 269 U.S. 385 (1926).
33. As examples in addition to the cases cited in note 11, supra (one of which, Hot%
v. Oursler, is perhaps glorified by being described as an accomplishment), consider the
cases on the status of the courts of the District of Columbia, O'Donoghue v. United States,
289 U.S. 516 (1933), and the Court of Claims, Williams v. United States, 2W9 U.S. 553
(1933).
34. 297 U.S. 233 (1936).
35. Paschal's Appendix C, a private memorandum by Sutherland on a Conference,
illustrates that Sutherland tended to "go along with" Taft and Van Devanter somewhat
more uncritically than with the rest of his colleagues; but Paschal's text discussion shows
that the Justice's relations with all of his colleagues were good.
;Associate Professor of Law, Yale Law School.
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